

# Malware in Mobile

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# Agenda

- Facts & figures
- Examples
- Detection
- Mobile Drive-By
- Good Practice
- Conclusion




# Facts & figures

- Google (Android market) and Apple (App Store)
  - 500K+ apps
  - Billions of downloads
- Juniper Networks research:
  - Mobile payments will triple in value by 2015
    - \$670 billion (up from \$240 billion last year)
  - Android malware up 400% first six months of 2011



# Examples (The old)


- Cabir (2004)
  - First computer worm capable of infecting mobile phones?
  - Was targeted at devices running **Symbian OS**
  - Hijacked the phone's user interface
- iKee (2009)
  - Targeted “Jail broken” **iPhones**
  - Compromised phones through default SSH password (alpine)
  - Turned the phone into both a bot and a botmaster.
  - Changed the wallpaper to an image of the 80's singer Rick Astley
  - Written as an experiment



```
/*  
  People are stupid, and this is to prove it so  
  RTFM. its not thats hard guys  
  But hey who cares its only your bank details at stake.  
*/  
  
// This is the worm main()  
#ifdef IPHONE_BUILD  
int main(int argc, char *argv[])  
{  
  if(get_lock() == 0) {  
    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "I know when im not wanted *sniff*");  
    return 1; } // Already running.  
  sleep(60); // Lets wait for the network to come up 2 MINS  
  syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "IIIIIII Just want to tell you how im feeling");  
  char *locRanges = getAddrRange();  
  // Why did i do it like this i hear you ask.  
  // because i wrote a simple python script to parse ranges  
  // and output them like this  
  // THATS WHY.
```

# Examples (The new)

- RootSmart (2012)
  - Utilizes the **GingerBreak Root Exploit**
    - Android devices with version less than 2.3.4 and 3.0
  - Does not include the root exploit inside the app!
  - Hides in an Android app named **com.google.android.smart**
  - Has the same icon as Android system setting app
  - Connects to a C&C server & sends various info to the server
  - Used to perform various tasks (e.g new outgoing calls)



```
00000000 94 51 48 17 96 f8 6c bd f9 fd 72 0d 7e 61 14 77 |.QH...l...r.~a.w|
00000010 21 22 77 4b 6b a9 27 d3 2a 1e d7 67 91 6e 20 17 |!"wKk.'.*..g.n .|
00000020
```

# Examples

- Android Counterclank (2012)

The screenshot displays the Symantec Connect interface for the Android Counterclank malware. At the top, the Symantec logo is visible. A yellow bar contains the service name: `<Service name="com.apperhand.device.android.AndroidSDKProvider"/>`. Below this, a smartphone screen shows a "Choose Difficulty" dialog with a photo of a person and "OK" and "Cancel" buttons. To the right, a "Search" button is shown with the text "Places the following icon on the home screen". A "Pervallance rate" section indicates "NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS: 1,000,000 - 5,000,000". A "Package Breakdown" tree shows the package structure: `com` (expanded) → `apperhand` (selected) → `common.dto` → `device` → `a` → `b` → `c` → `d` → `a` → `b` → `android`. The "Outgoing traffic details" section shows a list of identifiers: "MAC Address", "SIM Serial", "IMEI", and "IMSI", with an arrow pointing to a "Malicious Host" icon.



# Detection

- Static Analysis
  - Hard to detect unknown malware
  - No access to real-time data or control flow
- Dynamic Analysis
  - Need for more computing power
  - Detects unknown malware where signatures do not yet exist
  - Very low false-positive rate

# Detection in a dream world...

- Perform static analysis checks when a new software is installed
- Be able to send identifying information about an application to a cloud-based dynamic analysis service.
- Dynamic Analysis of Malware as a Service
- Not available... YET

# Mobile Drive-bys

- Until now, mobile users had to download an app to drive by



- A
- H



**JSBach** J. S. Bach  
Google News-E: Chamber music festival begins at Paramount -  
The-Burg: Chamber music festival begins at Paramount...  
[bit.ly/nG45oG](http://bit.ly/nG45oG)  
10 Sep ☆ Favorite ↻ Retweet ↩ Reply



# Good Practice

- Only download apps from a recognized source
  - Android Market / Apple Store
- Check reviews, ratings, and developer information
- Check the app permissions the app
- Always be alert for unusual behavior !
- Be up-2-date
- Use a trusted A/V

# In Short

- Facts & figures
  - The threat is real
  - Constant malware increase
- Examples
  - All users should think before installing apps
  - Cabir = Symbian
  - iKee = iPhone
  - RootSmart = Android
- Detection
  - Dynamic Analysis in A/V would provide added security
- Mobile drive-by
  - You don't need to install apps to be hit by malware
- Good practice
  - Be alert

# TAKK!

Verið velkomin í bás  
Þekkingar hf.

